Introduction
To talk about an animal
is effortless. Look at it and how it behaves and you can easily decipher what
it wants and demonstrate how it acts. Sharks react very aggressively at the
sight of blood and snakes never eat dead prey. Ever since the dawn of science,
man has been reduced to his physiological manifestations. The brain is reduced
into an organ which transmits electrical impulses to the body making it move.
His acts are reduced into mere behavior and conditioning from external
influences. As the 21st century came, man is but a specter of the
universe; insignificant and without value a mere conglomeration of physical
parts and manipulated by other people for their selfish desires.
Distant is the memory of the past
when man is considered as the prime creature of God when to talk about man is
to talk about the regality and the supreme goodness of God. To know and to act
are two faculties of man which prompted the ancients and the medieval
philosophers to speculate about. Indeed, he can know the truth and he can will
what he wants. From Plato to Ockham, they have presented their theories about
the intellect and the will. Each has their own appropriation of their past
influences and each has presented an original reflection on the relationship of
the two. However, among these philosophers none has been more influential than
Thomas Aquinas. Being an Aristotelian, Aquinas inherited the Aristotelian
method of philosophizing and the past speculations of Aristotle on potency and
act and along with it the concept of the intellect. Being a Christian, Aquinas
inherited the immense literature of the Christian faith from the Holy
Scriptures to the writings of the patristic fathers adding a Christian twist to
pagan knowledge.
Being these two, Aquinas is seen as baptizing Aristotelian philosophy.[1]
We can see Aquinas’s efforts to fuse man’s quest for truth and the desire
he has for it. The result is a theory of the intellect and the will. In this
paper, I shall elaborate on the convergence of the two faculties. Supporting
the interpretation that the intellect and the will act simultaneously, I would
place my efforts in proving this claim rather than just simply placing it as a
logical turn in interpretation. In the first chapter, I would elaborate on the
concept of desire and the relationship it plays with the passivity of the
sensual faculties (with a brief historical background to ground Aquinas’s
sources) and infer to the phenomena of the variegation
of the good. The second chapter, moves from the variegation of the good to the elucidation of the convergence
itself. Presenting the interpretations of Gilson and Coppleston, I would depart
from the intellectualist interpretation and support the interpretations of
Philipps, Kenny, and Elders proving that the simultaneity of the intellect and
the will is possible due to the reciprocal relationship of the two.
I. The
Dichotomy: the Intellect and the Will
i. Desire
Man desires something.
Aristotle summed up all the arguments before him and came with a strong conclusion:
“all men want to be happy.” This is tantamount in saying that we all desire something good. Indeed how
can man desire something which is detrimental to his own?
The concept of act and potentiality
is crucial in the analysis of desire. Every creature whether sentient or
rational desires something, like an animal who stops by the spring to drink
water he fulfills his desire to quench his thirst. Humans on the other hand
distinguished by the intellect fulfill his desire but is conscious of it.
Aquinas then proceeds to analyze the
desire in Question 80. In the mentioned Question, Aquinas elucidates on a very
important taxonomy between the sensory and the intellectual appetites. It is
then important to discuss the development of Aquinas’s concept of desire. T.H
Irwin in an article entitled “Who discovered the Will” presents a critical
historical overview of the concept of the will. He says that scholars would
attribute it to three persons: Augustine, Maximus the Confessor and Nemesius
and John Damascene.[2]
However, he claims that Aquinas developed this concept from a latent
Aristotelian idea of boulesis.
How does this connect with desire?
Aristotle would summarize all arguments and provide us with a brilliant
conclusion: we all go towards the good. Aquinas
along with other Christian writers before him would affirm this conclusion and
they would add God as the supreme end of everything. Therefore, we can consider
that every one of us go towards the good. Three works of Aquinas is important
in this exposition. The Summa and De Veritate are important works to
survey the taxonomy of the intellect and the will. In the Summa, Aquinas
extensively elucidates the concept of the intellect (q. 79) and the will (q.
82) and in the third article of the same question Aquinas fully elucidates on
the intellect and will relationship. However, before that in q. 80 and 81,
Aquinas expounds on the appetitive powers.
Here he distinguishes between the
sensitive appetite and the intellectual appetite (the will) in the Sed Contra Aquinas writes:
“The appetitive power is a
passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the
apprehended power is a passive power which is not moved.[3]”
Aquinas
sets the tone of the relationship of the sensitive power with the will. We
feel, we sense and we perceive things. It is important to take note that, the
sensitive apparatus perceives different things simultaneously. We see as we
hear things. All the sensitive apparatus that we have all function together.
Aquinas sets it in a general sense thus sensitive
appetite for we can hear yet not listen and touch but not feel. The
sensitive organs function because it is part of their physiological nature. Can
the ear choose not to receive sounds or the skin receive sensation? It is
essential now to claim that that the sensual faculties are passive powers. At
the moment of perception, the phenomena of the self-giveness of beings
constitute an important part of Thomistic theory of knowledge.[4]
Thus, this is where the concept of
the will begins. We all desire something
however, perception gives us different ideas. Consequently, this brings us to
another dilemma: the variegation of good.
ii.
Variegation of Good
An exploration on the
relationship between intellect and will is not complete if we not explore this
part. In the last paragraphs we have agreed that the sensitive appetite because
of its passive nature conceives
things in singularity. If we infer from that premise it is logical that we
encounter something good in them. In De
Veritate, Aquinas explains how creatures attain their goodness by way of
participation with the divine Esse.
“Things
are good by way of “participation.[5]”
This
line will be repeated in articles 1, 3 and 5. Here, we can find Aquinas’s
departure from the ancient Neo-platonic doctrine of emanation. The omnibenevolence of God made all things good and all
things participate in this divine essence.
The
created is good in participation with the goodness of God. In totality, things
around us possess different degrees of perfection (its actuality) and
potentiality. Individually, things go around in a circle of generation and
corruption (Aquinas here affirms Aristotle’s thesis) yet in participation with
the universality of substance and its participation with the divine essence it
possess goodness. Thus, in the totality of things (its substance) and the
participation with Esse, we can grasp
the whole idea of the good (along with the other transcendentals).[6]
The idea of the good is mostly
connected with its metaphysical aspect. If we look at the human being
encountering things around him every day, he encounters individual things. If
we look at the Thomistic theory of knowledge, everything starts with sense
perception and its passivity. However, it is never complete without the phantasm as the beginning of ideogenesis. After all this, it
undergoes the process of abstraction after that we get hold of the substance
which endures and is unchanging.[7]
It is then logical to infer that the singular things we know in the senses and
the relationship between the phantasm and the process of abstraction are the
two big blocks of Thomistic epistemology which is necessary.
Thus, in knowing singular things, we
encounter a multiplicity of beings. If I conceive of my fountain pen or of my
piece of paper and I act with what I know, I know on the first place individual
things (i.e. the fountain pen and the piece of paper.) both at the same time. The process of knowledge is then
important if we want to look into the intellect-will relationship and with its
reciprocal relation with the process of knowledge because it bridges the gap
between what I know and can will with how I know them to be good or how do I find
goodness in them. This is essential because in the Summa Contra Gentiles (the third work which is important to study),
Aquinas would assert that man acts for the good however, it must be directed to some definite thing.[8]
This definite thing is the Good. Thus, all things tend towards the
good. This basic concept however has many implications. 1. All of us tend
towards the good but, since goodness is a transcendental attribute of being,
how can we reconcile the abstract idea of the good with that of individual things
that we encounter everyday? 2. In question 85 and 86 of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas highlights the
workings of the intellect. The way we understand highlights the interplay
between the senses and the internal processes. The variegation of individual
things that we perceive might posit that we know a multitude of things however,
Aquinas in article 4 of question 85 in the reply to objection 3[9]
says.
Parts can be understood in
two ways. First in a confused way, as existing in the whole; they are known
through the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way
they are known distinctly; and thus each is known by its species, and hence
they are not understood at the same time.[10]
Our
understanding of individual things brings us to the phenomena of the
variegation of good. Consider a student peering through a list of university
courses and decides whether to take engineering, accounting or philosophy, if
he looks at the three all are equally good courses. His intellect gives him
three individual ideas of courses which he can will. Thus, we can ask is the will
ever dependent on the intellect?
II. The Convergence of
the Faculties: The Intellect with the Will.
Considering the exposition we have
done above, it is now essential to dwell on the question we have just raised
i.e. is the will subject to the intellect?
The interpretation of Aquinas’s idea about the intellect and will
relationship is important since this is a central problem in psychology[11]
i.e. the primacy of the intellect or vice versa. In Aquinas, we can see that
the most accepted interpretation of the intellect and will relationship is the
intellectualist standpoint. Scholars most notably Etienne Gilson accept this
approach in looking at Aquinas’s intellect-will relationship. In the book Elements of Christian Philosophy he
writes.
The human form of appetite,
which is the will, is offered by the intellect a choice of objects as wide as
the whole compass of being itself.[12]
Above we have
indicated how the intellect through the variegation
of the good would present various things to the will. Gilson’s
interpretation holds true to the discourse Aquinas carries in the third article
of Question 82 of the Summa Theologica and
article 11 of Question 22 of De Veritate.
Here in these two works, Aquinas demonstrates the relationship of the two
parties with each other. The Responsio
of the third article of question 82 demonstrates what we can call a Thomistic confusion; the nobility of the
intellect is highlighted twice (1) as
it is absolutely in itself and (2) it corresponds to the variegation of the
appetitable good.[13]
The nobility of the will on the other hand is highlighted once: as the
highlighted good.[14]
The absolute and relative distinction might prove the intellectualist view
however, if we accept the intellect’s nobility putting the will below as a
moving force towards the good there we can encounter a vicious circle as Philipps
highlights
We are not, however, at the
end of our difficulties, for if the intellect must determine the act of the
will and the act of the will must determine the judgment of the intellect, we
seem to be involved in a vicious circle. [15]
Raising this
particular issue, we find out that the intellect understands truths about
goodness and the will aims the good the truth.[16]
The interlocking relationship blooms out as the essential point in the analysis
of action. When I do something does intellect first present various objects
before I can will? How can we look into the relationship of the intellect with
the will? Philipps offers a better proposition at looking at this issue.
This all happens
instantaneously, so that it is not the will which first determines the
intellect, and then the intellect the will nor vice versa. There is no priority
of time of one determination to the other but both occur simultaneously.[17]
Thus
by indicating the simultaneity of the intellect and the will, we now shed light
to the confusion placed above. The intellect has as its end the truth and the will has as its end the good. Both are transcendental properties
of being. The position of Aquinas might hold the intellectualist viewpoint as
true prima facie. However, we might enter to the infinite regress as Kenny and
Philipps have seen.
The responsio of the fourth article of question 82 proves this point.
These powers include one another in
their acts because the intellect understands that the will wills and the will
wills the intellect to understand.[18]
The
two pronged movement of the will and the intellect proves the convergence of
the two faculties.[19]
This is a different outlook on the relationship of the intellect and the will
than the usual interpretation done by Coppleston (in the History of Philosophy)[20]
and Gilson. Departing from this interpretation, we now look at the intellect
and the will as two qualities in man. Aquinas in demonstrating the properties
of the intellect and the will bifurcates the
intellect and the will for demonstration but in reality both penetrate each
other.[21]
This gives us a more balanced stance in the relationship of the intellect and
the will. Moreover, this point out that man is a unity.[22]
With the simultaneity of the intellect and the will, man is viewed as a unity
and not only as the product of his faculties.
Conclusion
To act and to know are two different aspects of man. Each relate
with each other in harmonious unity. Although two, they act in simultaneity
with each other. The intellectualist interpretation posits man as a mere
knowing being. Subjecting the will to the intellect, they made man a slave of
his desires requiring the intellect to save it from its threshold and to control
it like a master overseeing his slaves. However, even the intellect itself is
influenced by the will. Man’s desire to know drives his mind to find the most
difficult answers he encounters. As I look at the heavens and wonder at the
constellations above me, I never fail to see that my mind possess this desire
to know it.
The simultaneity of the intellect
and the will is possible because of the reciprocity that each exhibit on each
other. The intellect understands the will and the will can move the intellect
to know. Nevertheless, the ends of the two faculties are both transcendental
properties of being. However, if one looks at the side of the intellect’s
knowing, the intellect gains the upper hand because it is being demonstrated.
If one looks at the acts of the will, one might find that the will is the
moving force it gains the upper hand because again it is being demonstrated.
Here we see Aquinas’s genius in demonstrating two distinct faculties yet both
working together. This distinction demonstrates the specific end of each
faculty. While the intellect and the will are distinct and their effects are
different in reality we see the unity and not really the prescinded one. The
interpretation of Gilson and Coppleston tend to overreact on the emphasis Aquinas
gives to the intellect in the Summa
yet, they fail to see the indwelling of the faculties with each other. Leo
Elders was right when he placed the bifurcated workings of the intellect and
the will yet he did not fail to see the convergence of the faculties.
The simultaneity of the intellect
and the will is possible due to the reciprocity of the two. If one looks at the
beginning of knowledge that is sense perception, one does not fail to see the
outward movement of the intellect towards the world. Although, we would not
dwell on Aquinas’s idea on intentionality (see Summa Contra Gentiles Book 3),
we see that the intellect in order to know must possess this desire to know.
Seeing this reciprocity, it now follows that neither the intellect nor the will
is absolutely prior to each other. This shows that the intellect and the will
both work together. The intellectualist interpretation never saw the
convergence that the faculties possess rather they placed the intellect as the
absolute priority in the relationship. This absolutism never saw the real
relationship between the two. If one speculates about the relationship of the
two considering its simultaneity. One sees the dynamic movement of the
faculties towards each end. In respect to this end, we see that the intellect
and the will have two ends. Yet, they move simultaneously to each end. As the
intellect goes to truth and the will to the good, the two possess a joint
relationship in order to achieve each other’s end. The intellect needs the
desire for its end without this intellectual desire it cannot move to its
specific end. The will works with the intellect and this dynamic duo work
together which constitutes the unity in the act.
Although the study is limited to the intellect-will relationship, in
the near future, it should be possible to expose Aquinas’s concept of
intentionality. This is important for Aquinas’s analysis of the philosophy of
human action. Intentionality brings to the fore the manifestations of the
intellect and the will into human action. As for now, the intellect and the
will go together in unity. As we have demonstrated above, it is important now
to look at this indwelling or convergence of the faculties as a sign of
Aquinas’s idea of making man a unity. Man is not a machine that can be
manipulated by electrical impulses from a machine or a collection of internal
processes that respond to stimuli rather, man is a universe within
himself.
[1] Frederick Coppleston, History
of Philosophy Volume III, (New York: Doubleday books)
[4]Karl Rahner, Spirit in the
World trans. William Dych, SJ (London: Sheed and Ward, 1968) 94
[8] Summa Contra Gentiles Book 3 Chapter 2
[9] Objection 3 Further the intellect understands a whole at the same
time, such as a man or a house. But, a whole contains many parts. Therefore,
the intellect understands many things at the same time.
[10] ST. Q.85 art IV
[11] Wilhelm WIldebrand, A History
of Philosophy volume 1: Greek, Roman, Medieval, (New York: Harper and
Brothers publications, 1958) p.329
[12] Etienne Gilson, Elements of
Christian Philosophy, (New York: Harper and Row. 1960) p. 251
[13] ST. Q 82 art III responsio: If therefore the intellect
and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect
is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects
to one another. For the object of the intellect
is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will;
since the object of the intellect is the very idea
of appetible good; and the appetible good,
the idea of which is in the intellect,
is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract
a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of
the intellect is higher than the object of the will.
Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object,
it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and
nobler than the will.
[14]ST. Q 82 art III resp. But relatively and by comparison with something
else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect,
from the fact that the object of the will
occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect.
Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler than sight,
inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which
there is color, though color is nobler and simpler than sound
[15]R.P Philipps, Modern Thomistic
Philosophy : An Explanation for Students Volume 1: The Philosophy of Nature, (Westminster:
The Newman Press, 1962) p. 288
[16]Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on
Mind,( London: Routledge, 1994) p.73
[17] Modern Thomistic Philosophy,
p. 288
[18]ST Q 82 art IV
[19]Leo Elders, The Philosophy of
Nature of St. Thomas Aquinas Nature, the Universe, Man,(Frankfurt am Main:
Peter Lang GmbH Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1997) p. 328
[20] Here Coppleston writes: “St. Thomas answers that, absolutely speaking,
the intellect is the nobler faculty since the intellect through cognition
possesses the object, contains it in itself through mental assimilation,
whereas the will tends towards the object as external and it is more perfect to
posses the perfection of the object in oneself than to tend towards it as
existing outside of them….in this way, St. Thomas, while adopting the
intellectualist attitude of Aristotle interprets it in a Christian setting. History of Philosophy Volume II, 101-102
[21]Ibid, 328
[22]De Torre, 180
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